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Abstract

Network Slicing in 5G:
Admission, Scheduling, and Security
by
Raneem Jassim Alghawi
Master of Science in Electrical Engineering
West Virginia University
Matthew Valenti, Ph.D., Chair
In the past few decades, there was an increase in the number of devices that have wireless
capabilities such as phones, televisions, and home appliances. With the high demand for wireless
networking, the fifth generation (5G) of mobile networks was designed to support the different
services of new applications. In addition, one of the technical issues that 5G would evolve is the
increase in traffic and the need to satisfy the user’s experience. With the evolution of wireless
networking and 5G, Network Slicing has been introduced to accommodate the diverse requirements
of the applications. Thus, network slicing is the concept of partitioning the physical network
infrastructure into multiple self-contained logical pieces which can be identified as slices. Each slice
can be customized to serve and meet different network requirements and characteristics. In terms of
security, network security has allowed for new security vulnerabilities such as Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) and resource exhaustion. However, slices can be isolated to provide better resource
isolation. In addition, each slice is considered an end-to-end virtual network, operators would be
able to allocate resources to the tenants which are the service providers. The isolated resources are
controlled by the tenants; each tenant has control over how to use them to meet the requirements
of the clients.
One of the challenges in network slicing is RAN slicing. The target of RAN Slicing is to meet
the QoS requirements of different services for each end-user. However, the coexistence of different
services is challenging because each service has its requirements. Each slice must estimate its
network demands based on the QoS requirements and control the admission to the slice. To solve
this issue, we consider the scenario for the enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB) and the ultrareliable-low-latency communication (URLLC) use cases’ coexistence , and we slice the RAN based
on the priority of the user application.
Keywords: 5G, QoS, RAN, eMBB, URLLC, DDoS.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
1.1

Fifth Generation 5G Wireless Technology

Growth in the mobile network and cellular industry is introducing a new generation of technology every 10 years: the 3G Universal Mobile Telecommunication Service (UMTS), the 4G LongTerm Evolution (LTE), and now the 5G New Radio (NR) that was released in 2020. With every
new generation, there is an improvement to the services provided in terms of speed, connectivity,
and performance. The focus of the technological improvements made in each generation is the
Radio Access Network (RAN). As shown in Fig. 1.1, the RAN consists of base stations that cover
a specific area and have a joint connection via network interfaces that are connected to the Core
Network [1].
5G is an expansion of the 4G technology, to support lower latency, higher throughputs, improved
efficiency, and the new broadband services that it enables is called Enhanced Mobile Broadband
(eMBB). While some operators identify that the mmWave spectrum is the main improvement of the
5G technology, others think it is the concept of virtualization which would lower the operational
costs [1]. 5G is viewed as a flexible technology that is designed to meet the requirements of
the diverse 5G use cases. Each continent has different goals and motivations for advancing 5G
technology. For instance, operators in Asia are hoping to have a higher throughput for the eMBB
service. European operators are looking for Internet of Things (ioT) advancements, and in North
America they want to increase the internet connectivity in the suburban areas. Therefore, 5G
technology goals depend on the operators and their targets [1].
It is expected that there will be an increase in the growth of network traffic in general and
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Figure 1.1: Radio Access Network and its relationship to the Core Network.
ioT in particular. The traffic will increase exponentially, therefore there is a high need for the 5G
technology, because it will be able to support the millions of devices at high speeds. The RAN
must be designed efficiently to be able to serve the traffic [1].

1.2

Use Cases and Requirements

1.2.1

Use Cases

5G is expected to satisfy a range of diverse goals such as having high speed, reliable and low
latency communication [2]. 5G is intended to create a new user experience, unlike the previous
generations which were focused on improving the radio technology and the spectrum bands. The
different 5G system use cases can be classified as follows:
1. Enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB):
The eMBB use case supports a steady connection with a high peak data rate, and it also
supports cell-edge users to improve upon one of the main limitations of the 4G system. The
traffic of eMBB is characterized by large payloads that are stable over long periods of time.
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The target of eMBB is to boost the data rate and have a reliable connection with a packet
error rate of 10−3 [3].
2. Ultra-Reliable Low Latency Communications (URLLC):
The URLLC use case supports small payloads that require high reliability and a very low
latency. The transmissions of URLLC are infrequent. Due to the reliability requirement,
the transmissions require the flexibility of being either scheduled on a share channel or sent
on demand via a random access channel. Scheduling guarantees that there are some available resources, while random access avoids having too many resources left idle due to the
infrequent transmissions. Moreover, to satisfy the latency requirements the response to the
transmissions has very strict timing constraints and restrictions. Due to the tight timing
constraints, reliability cannot be boosted through the reactive retransmission of incorrectly
received packets upon the receipt of a negative acknowledgement; i.e., by using protocols such
as ARQ or hybrid-ARQ. Instead, the reliability objective is met by proactively sending multiple transmissions using multiple frequency or spatial resources without waiting for a negative
acknowledgement [3]. This results in systems that might not be very spectrally efficient, but
they have high reliability.
3. Massive Machine-Type Communications (mMTC):
The mMTC use case supports a massive number of devices such as sensors and meters that are
low-cost and low-power. The service results in a high device density [4]. The transmissions of
mMTC send small payloads from devices that are only occasionally active [3]. The objective
of this use case is to target the PER of the transmissions on the order of 10−1 . Another
objective of mMTC is the ability to run a device from a battery that could go a long time
without needing to have its battery replaced, perhaps as long as 10 years for some applications
[3].

1.2.2

5G Requirements

Each radio interface, and its associated air interface, has to meet the requirements of International Mobile Telecommunications-2020 (IMT-2020) radio interfaces. As described earlier, the three
major use cases in 5G are eMBB, URLLC, mMTC. Each use case imposes different requirements
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on the air interface. For instance, eMBB requires a higher throughput with reasonable latency
and energy efficiency. URLLC has a strong demand for low latency, low error rates, and high
availability. Lastly, mMTC needs a higher connectivity density because of the large number of
devices transmitting [1]. Here are some of the major requirements for 5G and some of the potential
solutions:
1. High data rates
One of the essential factors for advancing the generations of wireless communication networks
is the data rate. There are some services that require high data rates such as video streaming
and virtual reality. Video streaming requires 8-15 Mbps, and some gaming applications require
about 25 Mbps. Also, in 5G, the data rate at the cell-edge should be increased to 100 Mbps,
which is 100 times better than it was in the 4G system. Some of the potential solutions
for increasing the data rate are the use of millimeter wave communications, massive Massive
multiple-input/multiple-output (MIMO) systems, and software-defined networking [5].
2. Latency
Some applications in 5G require a very low latency such as tactile internet service. This service
requires a very low latency communication system and demands a low round-trip latency in
the data plane. The latency that is required by this service should be around 1 ms, to match
the time scales associated with the sense of touch. Also, the URLLC use case requires low
latency because of the real-time interactions. Latency reduction would help improve the user
experience, and that could be achieved by having a flexible architecture with the help of the
SDN concept [5].
3. Scalability
With the anticipated increase of network traffic, network scalability is one of the major
advancements needed in the next generation of wireless communication network technology.
High scalability of a network would be able support the high traffic density of IoT services
and autonomous vehicles. However, high scalability would in fact require an upgrade to
all network layers. A sufficient amount of frequency spectrum resources is needed on the
physical layer to support the increasing workload. The network infrastructure should reduce
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Capability

Description

Peak data rate
User-experienced data rate
Latency
Mobility
Connection density

10-20 Gbps
50 Mbps - 100 Mbps
1 ms
500 km/h
106 /km2

Table 1.1: IMT-2020 requirements

the interference by controlling the transmitted power for channels. The media access control
(MAC) should also be designed to handle the traffic. However, scheduling has a big impact
on minimizing the latency. For the network and transport layers, a better routing algorithm
should be arranged for a very large group of devices such as user equipments (UEs). For
large-scale mobility, efficient methods are for accomplishing reliable handoffs for the many
devices that are expected and their associated mobility patterns. These many scalability
requirements can be accomplished using SDN and NFV [5].
4. Connectivity and reliability
Some use cases, such as mMTC, will result in a very high density. The base stations should be
able to handle all of the handovers. The network has to deploy handover routing algorithms
that would support coverage at the cell-edge area. Handovers make it hard to be connected
because of the authentication process with each handover, which would result in delay [5].
The eMBB use case supports connections that require a high peak data rate of 10-20 Gbps.
However, 5G is known to provide the fastest connection with user-experienced data rate of 100
Mbps- 1 Gbps. Use cases that require real-time interaction, such as URLLC require an immediate
reaction accomplished with a 1 ms latency. As users are expected to change their location within
the network, 5G is expected to support users’ mobility at speed of up to 500 km/h. The mMTC
use case is about connecting a massive number of devices, which would cause a high traffic density
that would require the network to enable connections up to 1 million devices per square kilometer.
Table 1.1 is a summary of the IMT-2020 [6].
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5G Enabling Technologies

There are several key enabling technologies that have been studied, developed, and proposed
for advancing wireless network technology to the fifth generation and beyond [7]. A summary of
these key technologies is given below.
1. Massive MIMO
Massive MIMO is a key technology that has been introduced in the 5G technology to handle
the growth in the network traffic. The MIMO concept, which involves the use of multiple
antennas at the base station and/or the user device, has been deployed for a while, for instance
as part of the 4G LTE system. Massive MIMO builds upon MIMO by supplying each base
station with a very large array containing many antennas, thereby allowing it to reach a large
group of users through spatial multiplexing technologies. This technology typically operates
in time-division duplex (TDD) mode, where both the uplink and downlink transmissions use
the same frequency band, but transmit and receive at different times. TDD systems are
particularly well suited to massive MIMO due to the reciprocity of the uplink and downlink
signals, since they are at the same frequency. That reciprocity avoids the need for channel
information to be fed back from each user device to the base station [8].
2. Beamforming
Beamforming technology is the concept of having the base station finding the most efficient
direction to transmit signals to each user. Like Massive MIMO, beamforming requires the
use of large antenna arrays. However, beamforming helps to reduce the interference issue
caused by the massive MIMO technology by managing the arrival time of packets to allow
users to send data at the same time. It can also help with increasing data rate for the
millimeter waves. Due to their short wavelength, they can not serve long-range applications,
beamforming would help by sending beams to users [9].
3. Full Duplex
Full duplex technology is the concept of transmitting and receiving in a single time and
frequency channel. Full duplex would improve the spectral efficiency of a network by a
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factor of two, but can create a self-interference issue by not having the uplink and downlink
channels separated in the time or frequency domain [10]. Managing such self-interference
typically requires some kind of interference canceling process.
4. Small Cells
Small cells are base stations that use low power and are known to be energy efficient. Due
to their lower power, small cells provide coverage to small areas, hence the name. This
technology has been introduced to improve the connectivity for cell edge users. However,
having a large number of small cells can cause interference issues, which can be solved by
having a small cells management scheme [11].
5. Millimeter Waves
Due to their limited bandwidths, frequencies below 6 GHz are no longer able to seriously
accommodate the increase in the network traffic due primarily to users with new applications
requiring very high data rates. Increasing the frequency for the wireless communication is
a viable solution to this issue. Millimeter waves range from 30 GHz to 300 GHz and their
wave length can vary from 1 to 10 mm. These frequency ranges have very high bandwidth
and are presently not very crowded with other users, and these properties will allow increased
capacity for connecting more users [12].
6. Device-to-Device Communication (D2D)
Device-to-device (D2D) technology allows devices to communicate directly without their signals needing to traverse any infrastructure nodes. This technology will support use cases that
require low latency due to the shorter and more direct travel path between devices, and it
will increase the network capacity by reducing the load on the infrastructure [13].

1.4

Classification of 5G Components

5G enables a significantly improved network connection, greater capacity, higher speed, and
lower latency than the previous networks. There are several major components and technologies
required to enable 5G networks, as described below:
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1. Core Network:
A core network (CN) is an essential component of any wireless network. The main task of
the core network is to connect the RAN with the third-party network or the tenant that is
providing the end-to-end connection to the client. There are three distinct planes used in core
network functionality: service management, session management, and mobility management.
In the previous fourth generation (4G) system, the core network was responsible for supplying
the data pipe. However, in the fifth-generation (5G) the core network architecture is known
to be a service-oriented architecture, which provides the network as a service that is broken
down into functions and sub-functions. Functions contain the session management, mobility
management, access management and user plane functions [14].
2. Radio Access Network:
The radio access network (RAN) is a sub-component of the network that has been used
in previous generations of technology. The radio access network (RAN) is a collection of
base stations and antennas that enables wireless communication between devices. The RAN
components are responsible for providing network coverage. Radio sites are responsible for
radio access and resource management at various radio sites, transmissions to the network
occur by RAN, and RAN is responsible for delivering the signal to the endpoint. Another
component of the RAN is the RAN controller, which is responsible for providing functionality,
radio resource management, and UE messaging through SDN switches [14].
3. Software-defined Network:
Software defined network (SDN) is an essential component in the 5G network architecture.
SDN is a way to describe network components and their functionality. It also helps with
network management and changing any of the network configurations. The goal of using
SDN is to separate the control plane outside the switches and control the data using the SDN
controller, and it also helps to deploy new services and applications by enhancing the network
[14].
4. Network Function Virtualization:
Network function virtualization (NFV) is about virtualizing all of the network node functions
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that consist of virtual machines with different software running on on the top of servers,
switches, storage devices and cloud infrastructure. All of the virtualized network functions
are connected to deliver the requirements of each use case [14]. NFV technology would enable
the concept of network slicing discussed in chapter 2.
5. Orchestration:
Orchestration is the concept of organizing, connecting, managing, and scheduling tasks to
deliver an end-to-end services. The Management and Orchestration (MANO) framework
provides the orchestration. Service orchestration can help with resource allocation, workflow
execution, management of network topology, and lastly configuring and activating. Orchestration plays a big role in the NFV architecture, such that the Network Functions Virtualization
Orchestrator (NFVO) is in charge of controlling the network services and creating the endto-end servies across the Virtual network functions (VNFs) [15].

1.5

Overview and Contributions of Thesis

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive look into how network slicing works. A
key focus is on security issues related to network slicing and scheduling algorithms. The remainder
of the thesis is organized as follows.
In chapter 2, we review the concept of network slicing and its key concepts. Network slicing is
considered to be a solution that has been introduced with the evolution of wireless networking to
accommodate the diverse requirements of the different applications. Some of the key concepts that
are introduced are the network slicing architecture, slice life cycle, and the network slicing types
which may occur in the core network or in the radio access network.
Chapter 3 considers how network slicing allows the creation of multiple virtual networks that
share the same core infrastructure. Due to enabling the resource sharing, the shared network will
be exposed to some security concerns such as Directed Denial of Service (DDOs). We review the
security challenges of the network slicing. We also analyze the life cycle of security threats, with a
focus on intra-slice and inter-slice security concerns. Lastly, we introduce some mitigation strategies
and technical solutions to help guarantee a secure network.
In chapter 4, we review the key concepts of a 5G network, such as the 5G NR frame structure,
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numerology and subcarrier spacing, slot length, and resource blocks. Then, we introduce the
different types of RAN scheduling that can support the 5G traffic. We present a prioritized round
robin scheduling algorithm, which gives priority to Ultra-reliable-low-latency (URLLC) traffic while
being fair and efficient with its resource allocation to other use cases in an effort to avoid starvation.
Finally in chapter 5, we review the findings of the thesis, and suggest ideas for future research.
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Chapter 2

Network Slicing
2.1

Overview

In the past few decades, there has been an increase in the number of devices that have wireless
capabilities such as phones, televisions, and home appliances. With the high demand for wireless
networking, the fifth generation (5G) of mobile networks is designed to support the different services
of new applications. In addition, one of the technical issues that 5G needs to accommodate is the
increase in traffic and the need to satisfy the user’s experience. In comparison to the fourth
generation (4G), the goals for 5G are significantly faster data rates, reduced latency, and support
for an increased number of connected devices, and all of these objectives need to be met. [16].
In addition, in the last few years there has been an increased diversity in the kinds of wireless
access networks with new types of communications, distinct access technologies, and services. Over
time, 5G will need to cope with the diverse requirements by offering new management and control
techniques. Each application has different requirements and characteristics that may include highspeed data rates, low latency, better connectivity, availability, or reliability. However, the network
infrastructure would be responsible for handling all the diverse traffic patterns, service requirements,
and capabilities of the devices [16].
With the evolution of wireless networking and 5G, network slicing has been introduced to
accommodate the diverse requirements of the applications. Network slicing is the concept of partitioning the physical network infrastructure into multiple self-contained logical pieces which can be
identified as slices. Each slice can be customized to serve and meet different network requirements
and characteristics. In terms of security, slices are isolated to provide better resource isolation.
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Figure 2.1: Network Slicing concept
In addition, each slice is considered an end-to-end virtual network, and operators can allocate resources to the tenants which are the service providers. The isolated resources are controlled by the
tenants, each tenant has control over how to use them to meet the requirements of the clients [16].
Network slicing is enabled by the capabilities of software-defined networking (SDN) and network function virtualization (NFV). It can be made into an end-to-end network by implementing
the network slicing from the core through the Radio access network (RAN). Virtualization technologies such as SDN and NFV can virtualize the network functions in the slices to satisfy their
characteristics [17].

2.2

Network Slicing Architecture

Network slicing allows the deployment of virtualization technology by using both concepts of
SDN and NFV in order to deploy the communication system of the physical infrastructure to
grant diverse 5G services to be delivered using a common infrastructure. Operators are allowed to
integrate the slicing infrastructure adeptly and manage the resources of the network to handle the

Raneem J. Alghawi

Chapter 2. Network Slicing

13

Figure 2.2: Overall Architecture in Network Slicing
increase in network traffic effectively. However, the network slice instance is a group of resources
from the virtualized infrastructure platform that provides virtual resources such as computing,
storage, and computing. Those virtual resources are organized to form a network slice [18]. A
network slice instance is an independent virtualized instance and is made by grouping the available
network resources and is considered to be an end-to-end logical network that can be designed to serve
a specific set of requirements for a use case, such as voice communication, vehicular communication,
and video streaming. The slices are differentiated based on the functionality expected and the
performance required. However, Satisfying a large set of QoS requirements for diverse use cases is
considered to be difficult [18].
A logical network can be defined as a set of network function instances on top of the physical
and virtual resources. Each slice instance is considered to be a logical network. The RAN and the
Core Network (CN) are the network domains that make up the 5G network architecture [19] [20].
As shown in Fig. 2.2, the network slicing architecture consists of three layers.
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1. Resource Layer
The bottom layer of the network slicing architecture, the resource layer is made up of network
functions and resources to serve the end-user. Some examples of network functions are slice
selection, switching, and routing functions. However, storage, processing, and the transmission of nodes are network resource examples. Both the resources and functions can serve one
or more slices if requested [19].
2. Network Slice Instance Layer
The network slice instance layer consists of slices, each slice is designed to satisfy the network
capabilities that were requested by the service instance. A slice can serve one or several
service instances which are the services provided to the customers and can either run across
or openly over another slice or network resources respectively. In addition, any two separate
slices may not integrate on the same physical architecture [19].
3. Service Instance Layer
The service instance layer is made up of service instances that are ready and available for
clients. Each of the resource managing functions is linked to the core network functions and
resources, and both can be assigned distinct management domains. However, the life cycle of
a slice is managed by the network slice management function. The network slice management
function oversees the slices entire process and integrates with the rest of the administration
functions. If a slice is made up of sub-slices, they each have their own management function.
The slice manager communicates with the network services management function, which
handles the entire service process [19].

2.3

Slice Life Cycle

The life cycle of a slice consists of four phases as shown in Fig. 2.3 and described below:
1. Slice Commissioning
During the commissioning phase, the slice does not exist yet, and the environment of the
network is getting prepared by identifying the services that an end-user is expecting by
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Figure 2.3: Life Cycle of a Network Slice
gathering the information from each client in order to create the slice template. A slice
template has information about each component, structure, and configuration of a slice [19].
2. Slice Activation
In the slice activation phase, all of the network resources and functions are installed and set
up. Slices are created using the slice template that has been built in the first stage. After the
slices are created, they are ready to be activated [19].
3. Run Time Operations and Monitoring
In the run-time operations and monitoring phase, the slices are monitored and reporting is
performed. Slice now are operating and providing the requested services from the client.
However, slices can be modified, for instance, by changing some configurations and links to
both the network functions and resources [19].
4. Slice Decommissioning
In the slice decommissioning phase, which occurs during the last stage of the life cycle, all
slices get decommissioned. All of the network functions and resources are freed and slices do
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not exist any longer [19].

2.4

Network Slicing Types

Each network slice instance consists of network resources and functions, which are configured
to build a complete network to provide the demands of the service instance. In brief, each network
slice is considered to be a separate part of the RAN, transport, and CN. Using the NFV technology,
each slice can be set up to be efficient and flexible. Using that technology, network components
can be virtualized across the CN and the RAN. Slicing can happen in the Core Network or in the
Radio Access Network [21].

2.4.1

Network Slicing in CN

Core Networks serve various purposes as single network architecture. However, using virtualization technology has helped to design networks that are more efficient and flexible. Having a
flexible system has made it easier for network designers to customize solutions for clients. Network
slicing in the core networks allows the separation of each core network. Slices can run on the same
infrastructure or a different one based on the operator, that way we do not have a single physical
network layer. In order to have an efficient system, each network slice would have an access to
the infrastructure, cloud services, and the VNFs. Using the SDN technology, we would be able
to separate the control plane from the user plan which would improve the efficiency of 5G core
networks [17].
Separation of the planes has many effects on the 5G core- network architecture. Such separation helps the migration to cloud-based deployments, moves the user plane closer to the user
device, and allows for the functionality of the user plane to be matched to the needs of the various
slices. With the diverse use cases, and as each of them needs different connectivity requirements,
user-plane functionality can be customized to meet the most cost-efficient scheme for each use case.
For instance, the mMTC use case which results in a low device density and low mobility, has low
connectivity requirements compared to the eMBB use case, which results in a high payload volume.
eMBB can have various services, such as web browsing and gaming. For each sub-service of the
use case, the requirements of that service can be implemented within the network slice. One of
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the benefits of plane separation is that planes may be placed in different locations. For instance,
having the control plane located in the center makes the execution more efficient. While the user
plane can be allocated over the sites that are closer to the user, it would help decrease the round
trip between the user and the service requested from the network [17].

2.4.2

Network Slicing in RAN

There are two important prospects in the concept of network slicing in the RAN; The radio
access technology (RAT) that actually supports the network service that is provided by the slice,
and the structure of RAN resources to support the network slice. However, 5G is expected to meet
certain Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) targets. The fourth generation (4G) was mainly focused
on supporting eMBB services. However, in later releases, 4G improved to support various use cases
such as machine-type communications (MTC) and direct device-to-device (D2D) communications
[17]. Furthermore, RAN slicing is the concept of aligning a slice-ID to a set of configuration rules
for the RAN. The planes do not get separated, but the RAN configuration rules get assigned for
each slice to meet the requirements of the network services [17].
Some of the requirements of designing a RAN Slicing are:
1. Each slice must be configured by applying the rules to the RAN control and user plane
functions to be supported in the RAN.
2. Functionality of slices may be similar to several slices.
3. RAN resource usage is controlled by the common control functions.
While addressing some of the configuration aspects in RAN slicing:
1. Resource management:
Slices that are supported in the RAN may share the same radio resources (time, frequency,
space) and the communication hardware (analog radio components, digital baseband processing components) based on the configuration rules applied to the network slice. Each slice
attains the resources needed based on their request and priority. Slices get their requested
resources by scheduling or contention. By scheduling, each slice proposes a request to the
scheduler that can be in the base station or the central RAN controller. The scheduler’s
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responsibility is to allocate radio resources to each slice based on their request. On the
other hand, it can happen by the contention, that a set of pre-defined configuration rules are
allocated to the slices [17].
2. Slice-specific admission control:
Admission control is essential to manage the access to the network slices. slices are configured
based on their demands. For instance, a URLLC use case must get a guaranteed low latency
with high-reliability access. With the admission control, a UE sends a request to the scheduler
to get admission but they may not get access if the slice is not activated in the access point
[17].
3. UE awareness on the RAN configurations:
When UEs get admitted to a network slice, the UE is unaware of the RAN configurations that
are applied to the slice. Therefore, the UE needs to receive the RAN configuration before
getting admitted to the slice. Due to some services requiring advanced RAN configurations
[17].
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Chapter 3

Security and Challenges in Network
Slicing
3.1

Overview

Unlike the previous generation networks, 5G supports network slicing within its architecture.
Network slicing is considered to be the distinguishing key in 5G that would help to achieve the
enhanced capacity to serve more clients. With the existence of different use cases, 5G technology
satisfies these diverse requirements by using the concept of network slicing. A slice is a logical
network that can be optimized to meet a wide range of heterogeneous requirements [22].
Network slicing provides a fragmented architecture where multiple logical networks are embedded within a shared infrastructure. Each logical network has its own logical topology, security
structure, performance requirements, network functions, network resources, and end-to-end connections. That being said, each logical network performs its designated tasks because each segment of
the network is designed by the network characteristics to have the capability of delivering a service
to an end-user. For instance, autonomous vehicles require low latency and high reliability. On the
other hand, HD streaming requires high bandwidth [22].
By partitioning the network, each virtual network will be designed for specific purposes, such as
communication, storage, and reliability. The ability to efficiently use network resources to provide
different levels of service is a major advantage of this technology. The platform is scalable with
service requirements according to the design load, ensuring greater reliability [19].
Businesses are innovating their business models more easily now and that is due to the differ-
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entiated architecture. From a business view, this has helped to diversify revenue opportunities and
improve communication channels. For instance, the automated operation processes have made it
easier to order products, process payments, and deliver items. However, these types of processes
can be performed now easier and quicker, with high security to allow service providers to serve the
clients more efficiently Businesses are innovating their business models more easily now and that is
due to the differentiated architecture. From a business view, this has helped to diversify revenue
opportunities and improve communication channels. For instance, the automated operation processes have made it easier to order products, process payments, and deliver items. However, these
types of processes can be performed now easier and quicker, with high security to allow service
providers to serve the clients more efficiently [19].
The concept of slicing in Ethernet networks can be traced back to Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs), which 5G network slicing borrows. Network slicing particularly relies on Software
Defined Networking (SDN), and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) [22]. NFV allows the
creation of network slices through interconnected virtual machines (VMs). These virtual machines
are coordinated through SDN orchestration, which flexibly configures network slices and reserves
resources for the heterogeneity that end users may use. SDN is used to control encryption within
each network slice. This helps to ensure security and privacy for data passing between networks
[19].

3.2

Challenges in RAN Slicing

As discussed in the second chapter, one of the main targets in RAN slicing is to satisfy the
QoS requirements of the diverse requested services. However, designing a RAN slicing system that
would support the various use cases is complicated, the issue can be illustrated as follows according
to [21] and [23]:
As specified by the 3GPP, the three major use cases in 5G can be categorized into URLLC,
mMTC, and eMBB. Each of the use cases demands a different data rate, reliability, and latency
from the network. For example, eMBB requires a high data rate and can endure high latency and
low reliability. In contrast, the URLLC use case focuses on low latency and very high reliability.
For example, autonomous driving cars use cases need an immediate reaction and high reliability
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to avoid car accidents. However, for the mMTC use case, it needs high connectivity since we have
a massive number of requests. Hence, satisfying each use case is hard and the framework of RAN
slicing needs to be designed reasonably to satisfy the diverse QoS requirements for the use cases.
Additionally, according to [23] the resource allocation for a large number of slices can cause many
difficulties. Each slice must satisfy the QoS targets and the fairness between each slice must be
guaranteed.
While there are also some challenges in terms of the user’s mobility, each user can change
their location due to their life and workstyle, which affects the service traffic among the cells. In
addition, the dynamics of a cellular network may have two patterns, a long-term and a short-term
pattern. An example of a long-term pattern is service traffic. In contrast, the dynamics of a wireless
channel are considered a short-term pattern. The pattern for the traffic of service over a period of
the network frame will differ from time to time. Control over the RAN slicing multiple times and
spatial is true.
Interference is considered to be an issue in the wireless network environment. Slices will be completely isolated, considering a single-cell scenario. On the other hand, the spectrum and frequency
will be reused in the multi-cell scenario which will cause interference concerns. Radio resources
should be multiplexed for a better RAN slicing operation.
In addition, the network controller can not have the competence to enhance the QoS overall
performance service for each use case. For example, the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) use case
request, which requires low latency and high reliability. Its service requirements are hard to achieve
because of the costed latency. Mobile data will be needed by the network controller to be able to
satisfy the users by signaling overhead. So, a control at different times over the network is needed
to avoid signaling overhead which would increase the cost of advancing the RAN slicing control.
Moreover, each service has its associated Service Level Agreement (SLA). However, SLA defines
the QoS requirements for each slice and use case. For example, the bandwidth, the throughput,
and the latency that the network must deliver to each service. The SLA has to be monitored in
the case that the QoS targets can not be met for a specific service, to inform the customer so they
can readjust their security measurements. Monitoring can also help to alert if there are any flows
with the functionality. Hence, monitoring can be done individually for each user associated with
a different slice. Additionally, virtual network monitoring requires monitoring of the physical and
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virtual resources. After each SLA monitoring, the key performance indicators (KPI) have to be
reported with every user and slice details. For instance, throughput, reliability, delays, efficiency,
and lastly the slice load.
The network in the slicing concept accepts third parties such as tenants that act as the virtual
network operator. However, this can cause some challenges depending on the level of control given
to the tenant.
In the lowest level of control, the operator has full control over the SLA, it’s job is to report
the slice and use case operation and is responsible for managing the network. However, the third
party can have an access to monitor the KPI.
In the case of giving the third party full control over the network slice, the operator would just
provide the infrastructure to the third party, which operates the slice. In this case, if the slices were
designed and pre-configured by the operator, or it’s the third party’s job to design a slice by the
slice templates that were created by the operator or the tenant can design a new slice with specific
functionality.
Lastly, if the third party has partial control over the network slice. The third-party can partially
control some functionalities of the network and maybe change some configurations as well. For
example, if the tenant wants to expand the coverage for a specific area. Some configurations can
be accepted as long as it does not affect the isolation of the slice. However, this could raise some
difficulties in the global performance of the network.

3.3

Security Challenges in Network Slicing

Network slicing by using a fragmented architecture with different partitions for facilitative
infrastructure and resources opens up 5G technology to a variety of security vulnerabilities. One
of the biggest security challenges for network slicing in 5G is Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks [24]. These attacks involve targeting services with the goal of overloading them with a large
amount of traffic till they are inaccessible to other end-users.
DDoS attacks can also take the form of depriving a target of resources it shares with other
hosts. The misappropriation of necessary features in 5G technology, such as overload control
metrics, could facilitate these types of attacks. Overload control metrics in 5G design, such as
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the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), are used to limit communication across networks
under the following conditions: Overload within a network. However, at this time, this feature does
not incorporate checks to ensure that overload header indicators are placed by the intended users.
Within the virtual networking infrastructure offered by network slicing, this lack of control opens
up vulnerabilities for users. This overload control indicator may be misused by others, which could
lead to a denial of service [24].
Moreover, network slicing has another security concern which is sharing and depletion of resources. Network slicing allows dynamic resource sharing among slice tenants, in a way that allows
for better resource efficiency. Managing slices is considered to be a challenge, allocating resources
to each slice to be capable of delivering the requested services and to ensure that each slice is
maximally optimized. Controlling the slices is also a challenge, since the network operator has
the maximum control, there is sufficient incentive to allow partial permission. In order to fully
take advantage of 5G networking, it is necessary to address the challenge of sharing resources and
allocation among different devices. Further sharing of resources between network slices creates security vulnerabilities. With a shared core architecture, network slices are designed to have different
security protocols in order to optimize performance. However, this creates vulnerabilities if other
slices on the network share the same security protocol [25].
Security protocols that can be adjusted on a slice-by-slice basis can be easily exploited to
harm other slices. Therefore, it is important to take into account security protocols among the
multiplicity of slices when dealing with concerns about resource sharing. The proliferation of
security challenges posed by network slicing in 5G technology creates new challenges for computer
technology. With previous wireless networks, such concerns tended to be more limited in scope.
However, with resource sharing becoming an essential part of network slicing, such security breaches
now have a wider capacity and therefore a greater impact. For example, DDoS attacks targeting
individual slices now present a significant risk of starvation of host resources, as slices are tenants
in a larger shared virtualization infrastructure [24]. However, resource sharing in 5G technology is
an important fundamental feature that explains many of the benefits of 5G technology.
Infrastructure sharing has many advantages in cost and resource consumption. However, sharing
resources causes a challenge in securing 5G networks and mitigating risks associated with a network
slice architecture. However, resource sharing and network slicing are essential in 5G technology
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Figure 3.1: Threats for each phase of the slice life cycle
and can not be eliminated to avoid such concerns. There is a need to find a solution to manage the
security challenges posed by multi-tenancy [19].
The various security concerns related to network slicing in 5G technology have been highlighted
in the section above. This section analyzes these security concerns with a much more in-depth
approach based on the nature of the vulnerability. There are three primary categories of security
vulnerabilities:
1. Network slice life-cycle security concerns
2. Intra-slice security concerns
3. Inter-slice security concerns

3.3.1

Slice Life-Cycle Security Challenges

In chapter 2 section 2.3, we discuss that a slice consists of four phases: slice commissioning,
activation, run-time operations, monitoring, and lastly slice decommissioning. However, there are
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some security concerns within the slice life-cycle. At various points during this life cycle, various
security concerns are raised with the network slice. These security concerns can be attributed to
both design vulnerabilities in the preparation, installation configuration, and activation phases, as
well as functional vulnerabilities in the run-time phase and the decommissioning.
In the commissioning stage also known as preparation, poorly designed network slice templates
may expose the slice to vulnerabilities that could be exploited in the future. This would be the main
point of attack. Design flaws that were found during the development stage of this system once
implemented can lead to serious security concerns during run-time and during decommissioning
[19].
The second stage of a slice’s life cycle is installation, activation, and configuration. There may
be certain security concerns that could result from this. The implementation of the design template
to a functional network slice marks the beginning of actual functionality in the network. This design
template may lead to errors that open up the network to security vulnerabilities such as creating
fake slices or changing the configuration of slices before or during this phase [19].
The run-time phase of the slice’s life cycle is characterized by many vulnerabilities. If The
first two phases are potentially flawed, then this phase will display all of the flaws. These flaws
can result in vulnerability to DDoS attacks, data privacy breaches, deletions, or denial of access to
slices, thus actually impacting slice functionality. In addition, any changes made to the resource
configuration during this phase may expose slices to vulnerabilities [19].
The main concerns in the last phase of the slice’s life cycle around data privacy and resource
appropriation. Inefficient decommissioning protocols may allow sensitive data to be exposed or use
up previously allotted resources more than necessary. Therefore, it is clear that throughout the life
cycle of a network slice, various security concerns are always present. To this end, it is important
to take appropriate mitigation measures at all stages of the slice’s life cycle [19].

3.3.2

Intra-slice Security

The network itself presents multiple security vulnerabilities, even while ignoring the other points
of attack. 5G technology is being largely diverted to non-technical users who are not aware of
security, unlike organizations that are considered to be technical users. For shared infrastructure,
this is a serious attack point for unauthorized users. If access to the slices is available, this opens
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up the possibility of DoS attacks that can have a significant impact on the functionality of network
slices. In addition, unauthorized access to slices raises concerns about slice functionality, where the
identity of slices is a major factor limiting legitimate users’ access to slices, in order to reduce the
risk of unauthorized access to 5G devices. It is important to implement those strong authentication
and control devices [19].
The slice service interface presents another potential security vulnerability in network slicing.
The interface between the slice and the services it facilitates may be vulnerable to exploitation.
Attacks on the service affect the functionality of the slice, which consequently affects other services
running on the same slice. Addressing these concerns requires implementing robust security controls
and improving service configurations to limit their vulnerability to attack. More importantly, it
may be effective to achieve partial isolation between services provided by the same slice, effectively
limiting the chain reaction of attacks on a single service being transmitted to other services. All
communication interfaces within a slice, i.e. layers, sub-slices, slices, services, etc. between slices
and resources. To ensure that the target level of security is maintained, the system should have
robust mechanisms [19].
Depending on the configuration of a network slice, sub slices to the slice might present feasible
attack points that jeopardize the security of the slice. A slice may include multiple interconnected
sub-slices with differing security protocols, in which case an attacker may easily exploit the weakest
link in the chain of sub-slices to gain access to the entire slice. Therefore, it is essential to prevent
this possibility by implementing controls that address the risk of sub-slice interconnection, such as
end-to-end isolation of sub-slices. One way to address this issue is through mutual authentication
requirements whereby both tenant and the host are involved in authentication in the case of a single
slice manager. Alternatively, if multiple tenants are slice managers, they must authenticate each
other to reduce the risk of unauthorized access to the slice. In addition, strict legal restrictions
must be imposed and implemented to prevent tenants from accessing requests, data sources, and
features. Access is legally permitted. Finally, the resources and network function that the slice
relies on can be attacked in various ways, including physical damage, cyber-attack, or software
attack to damage the functionality of the slice. To ensure reliable authentication, secure booting,
credential access, integrity verification, and physical security, all of these must be given high priority
[19].
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Inter-slice security

The third set of security concerns in network slicing arises from the potential for network slicing
to compromise information and resources within a shared core infrastructure. With 5G consumer
devices becoming more common, hackers may find them to be a valuable target. Specifically, a
consumer device that is granted access to one site may exploit inter-linkages with other slices to
gain unauthorized access to other slices. This has been a fairly high level of success, especially since
the adversarial device is not a stranger. A chain of slices in the network. It is easier to execute
a DoS attack against a network slice that shares resources than against a network slice that does
not share resources. This risk increases disproportionately if the access technology is different.
In addition, if a single device is allowed multiple access to different slices with different levels of
security protocols, there is an increased risk of data breaches from more secure sites to less secure
sites. To protect against security concerns, the most effective strategy is to set up strict isolation
parameters between slices sharing the same network resources [19].
service-to-service communication can also be a point of vulnerability on a network slice. In
networks where different slices of the infrastructure offer different services, vulnerabilities in one
service may allow attacks on other services. However, in 5G networks, where services are run
on independent slices, this risk is low. Intra-slice communication can present a security risk for
network slices in 5G networking. Less secure slices may be exploited as avenues to access more
secure slices through communication interfaces between these slices. Strengthening slice isolation
will help protect against vulnerabilities. This keeps the slices from being affected by any compromise
[19].
Management systems may present inter-slice security concerns in network slicing. Sharing
management of slices makes it possible to execute attacks on other slices. To protect the network
from attacks, proper isolation is necessary to configure the shared network infrastructure. In
addition, proper restrictions must be put in place to make changes to slices within the slice manager.
The shared resource infrastructure is a key vulnerability in network slicing. One way hackers can
damage a network is by using attacks that consume resources, such as those that exhaust computer
resources. This can have a ripple effect on other parts of the network, exacerbating the damage. The
best way to mitigate the risk of this happening lies in preferential isolation and resource allotment
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[19].

3.4

Technological Solutions Towards 5G Network Security

The security vulnerabilities presented by network slicing have been analyzed in depth above
based on the type of vulnerability. This section will assess the various solutions that can be
implemented to combat these vulnerabilities. In particular, end-to-end security, isolation, secure
management, and orchestration of network slices within a shared architecture will be explored [19].

3.4.1

End-to-End Security

One of the most effective strategies to address the 5G security concerns posed by network slicing
technology is to manipulate the system architecture to achieve end-to-end security. It is important
to note that these security concerns may come from two different types of adversaries [24]:
1. Adversaries with administrative control: someone who manages the resources of the slice such
as the tenant, the mobile operator, or an external attacker who compromised the slice.
2. External adversaries: a user of the slice, or someone who could attack the slice.
End-to-end security can manage security concerns from external adversaries, but it can also
provide significant insulation against adversaries who have administrative control. The architecture
model of network slicing features multiple virtual networks that are isolated from each other and
from the shared network infrastructure core [25]. These virtual networks have the necessary characteristics to enable them to perform a specific function or to be similar to other networks that are
already in use. The overall security of these networks reduces the concerns of vulnerabilities that
result from communication between host resource interfaces and slices, between slices themselves,
and between sub-slices or slice components of a network slice to limit the threats of the network at
endpoints including access, permission [24]. External adversaries often try to attack the interface
between communication lines in order to get into the network. End-to-end security in encryption
and decryption to and from the network slice significantly reduces this risk making it harder for
external attackers to infiltrate the network. This ensures that the data is adequately protected from
potential intrusion and unauthorized access and is stored in a format that bets ensure its security.
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Isolation

Resource sharing in network slicing presents significant security vulnerabilities. Multiple tenants sharing a shared infrastructure can create new security challenges in 5G, which need to be
addressed. To address security concerns arising from network slicing, isolation has been sought as
an efficient means to minimize the impact on host resources and network communication. This
research studies intra-slice and inter-slice security vulnerabilities on various levels, aiming to help
protect devices from 5G communication and sharing resources. Addressing these risks allows for
the full exploitation of 5G network capacity. Two tiers of slice isolation have been proposed and
explored in minimizing network slicing-associated vulnerabilities [24]:
1. Inter-slice isolation:
These features separate the host hardware resources from the network slice as a whole. This
severely restricts communication between slices since they do not share hardware resources.
[24]
2. Intra-slice isolation:
The separation of host hardware resources between slice components allows each slice to focus
on its own tasks, eliminating the sharing of resources between slices. The goal of intra-slice
isolation is to create different hosts for slice components so that they can share resources
more efficiently, reducing the need for defense against all slices [24].
Slice isolation has emerged as a more efficient solution for mitigating DDOs attacks than target
network upscaling and traffic blocking. One way to reduce the risk of a large-scale cyber-attack
is to share common infrastructure. This way, if one slice of the network is attacked, the others
can remain unaffected. Reducing the number of communication links between the various slices
reduces the risk of a widespread attack. Experimental simulations have shown that slice isolation
can help to minimize the impact of DDoS attacks, which can then be contained and prevented from
spreading to other slices [24].
Slicing through isolation has to be done efficiently in order to ensure that users receive the
desired quality of service (QoS). Inter-slice isolation provides strong resource isolation, limiting
the possibility of an attack. However, it also limits the efficiency of the use of resources, counters
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to optimizing the benefits of 5G technology. [24]. Therefore, a number of algorithms and block
diagrams have been explored to determine isolation models that retain the desired QoS level [26].

3.4.3

Secure Management and Orchestration

Network slicing-associated security concerns can be managed by enhancing the management of
network slices. While end-to-end security is best for external attackers, it’s worth noting that there
are also significant risks to attackers with administrative control. As such, effective management
and orchestration of security risks are essential in mitigating this type of risk. A variety of actions
can be taken to ensure the security of slices. These include tighter access control regimes, firewalls,
virtual private networks (VPNs), and authentication capabilities designed to mitigate security
vulnerabilities created by resource sharing in network slices [26].
For example, to limit security breaches caused by multiple tenants, mutual authentication can
be implemented to limit unauthorized access to other slices. This should be done in conjunction
with the implementation of the Security Level Service Agreement (SLSA), which will allow for
enhanced and efficient management of network slices [27]. The SLSAs require security service
providers to guarantee that specific security protocols are in place to address security concerns
within a shared infrastructure. This vertical integration management in security provision will
tackle security concerns from both internal and external adversaries, as well as address mobilityrelated challenges in network slicing [27].
Some scholars have proposed that slice management allows manual distribution of functions
between slices, which improves the security of the management and limits the network slice’s
vulnerability to DDoS attacks. Resource allocation while maximizing benefits from network slicing
is a challenging issue in network slicing management [19]. A reliable system is required to guarantee
the accommodation of maximal diversified service requests with limited resource allotment.
This requires the establishment of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that further improves slice
management and optimizes security for the slices. To effectively manage and orchestrate security
measures to mitigate network slicing vulnerabilities, organizations will need to adopt standardized
standards for cybersecurity that legally protect network slices. This will be essential in closing
loopholes in slice management and promoting slice security [26].
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Chapter 4

Comparison of Different RAN
Scheduling Methods
4.1

Overview

Designing a fifth-generation (5G) mobile network to support the various use cases with different
requirements is a very difficult challenge. However, 5G is considered to have a better performance
in terms of efficiency and flexibility compared to the past generations. As discussed in Chapter 1,
the eMBB service is suitable for high data rate applications such as video streaming and is able
to satisfy the need for moderate reliability with a packet error rate (PER) of 10−3 . On the other
hand, the URLLC use case is the service that has a short packet size and is in need of a PER with
10−5 , which corresponds to very high-reliability [21].
The concept of network slicing is about sharing the network services between different use
cases. Since there are multiple waveform configurations in 5G NR, radio frames can be customized
based on these needs. In addition, the 5G NR standard requires that the sub-carrier spacing (SCS)
increases when higher frequency bands are used. The radio frame in the 5G NR is set to 10 ms,
while each sub-frame is always 1 ms, disregarding the numerology of the network system. The
number of symbols within a slot and the number of the slots within a sub-frame can be changed
by changing some parameters of the network such as numerology [21].
For the URLLC service, as it needs an immediate reaction to satisfy the low latency requirement,
one way to do that is by changing the SCS. Having a higher SCS would affect the length of the
time slot. Another way is to reduce the symbols in the packet Transmission Time Interval (TTI)
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by using the concept of mini slots. Studying the scenario for the coexistence of the eMBB and
URLLC services over the same resources introduces problems for the eMBB traffic, and contrarily
the latency requirements of the URLLC transmissions can not be disregarded [21]. There are two
proposed scheduling solutions by the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP):
1. Orthogonal Scheduling:
In orthogonal scheduling, some of the frequency channels are reserved for the upcoming
URLLC traffic. There are two types of reservations: semi-static and dynamic reservations.
When the gNB transmits the configuration of the frame structure at irregular times, this is
known as semi-static. On the other hand, dynamic reservation is when the frame structure
is modified with each scheduled user by the downlink control channel. The disadvantage of
orthogonal scheduling is that when there is no upcoming traffic for the URLLC, all of the
reserved resources will be wasted [28].
2. Preemptive Scheduling:
In preemptive scheduling, the gNB would pause the transmission of the eMBB service if there
is upcoming URLLC traffic. The traffic for the URLLC would be scheduled in a short TTI in
an effort to satisfy the latency restraint. However, the reliability of the eMBB transmission
would be affected, so a solution for the services’ coexistence is needed [28].

4.2

5G NR Frame Structure

The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has defined the 5G NR frame structure specifications and here we present details of the frame structure in regards to numerologies, subcarrier
spacing, and slots [29].

4.2.1

5G NR Numerology and Subcarrier Spacing

In the 4G system (LTE), there is only one type of numerology/subcarrier spacing considered in
the network which is a subcarrier spacing of 15 kHz. However, the major improvement in 5G NR
is having multiple Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) numerologies to support
diverse services as given by Table 4.1 where µ is the numerology for the subcarrier spacing and
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µ

δf = 2µ ∗ 15[kHZ]

Cyclic prefix

0
1
2
3
4

15
30
60
120
240

Normal
Normal
Normal, Extended
Normal
Normal
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Table 4.1: Transmission numerologies.

µ

slot
Nsymb

f rame,µ
Nslot

subf rame,µ
Nslot

0
1
2
3
4

14
14
14
14
14

10
20
40
80
160

1
2
4
8
16

Table 4.2: Number of OFDM symbols per slot, number of slots per frame, and number of slots per
subframe for the normal cyclic prefix.

µ

slot
Nsymb

f rame,µ
Nslot

subf rame,µ
Nslot

2

12

40

4

Table 4.3: Number of OFDM symbols per slot, number of slots per frame, and number of slots per
subframe for the extended cyclic prefix.

δf is the subcarrier spacing. There are two types of cyclic prefixes it can be normal or extended
according to 3GPP [29]. A cyclic prefix is a prefix of a symbol or the guard interval between each
symbol to protect the signals from intersymbol interference.

4.2.2

Slot Length

Depending on the µ numerology chosen for the network configuration, slots within a subframe
rame,µ
are numbered nµs ∈ {0, ...,Nsubf
-1}. While slots within a subframe can be numbered, nµs,f
slot
rame,µ
∈ {0, ...,Nfslot
-1}. Th number of the consecutive OFDM symbols in a slot depends on the cyclic

prefix of a frame, and is given by Tables 4.3, 4.5.
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Figure 4.1: Frame structure of a subcarrier spacing of 15 kHZ

Figure 4.2: Frame structure of a subcarrier spacing of 30 kHZ

4.2.3

Mini Slots

As mentioned earlier, LTE uses fixed numerology of 15 kHz SCS, unlike 5G which supports a
SCS of 15 - 240 kHz as referenced in Table 4.3. 5G NR supports having fewer OFDM symbols in
a slot. A slot originally consists of 14 OFDM symbols. The mini slot concept can support a slot
with only 2, 4, or 7 OFDM symbols per slot. These shorter slots help to decrease the transmission
time as shown in Table 4.5 [30].
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SCS [kHZ]

7 symbols

4 symbols

2 symbols

15
30
60

500 µs
250 µs
125 µs

286 µs
143 µs
71 µs

143 µs
71 µs
36 µs
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Table 4.4: The Time Duration of a Mini-Slot as a Function of the Number of Symbols It Contains

Figure 4.3: Mini Slots
µ

SCS [kHZ]

Bandwidth in kHZ per RB = 12 × SCS

0
1
2
3
4

15
30
60
120
240

180
360
720
1440
2880

Table 4.5: bandwidth occupied by a Resource Block.

4.2.4

Resource Blocks

A Resource Block (RB) consists of 12 consecutive subcarriers in the frequency domain. In
LTE, a RB is defined to occupy one slot in a time domain and 12 subcarriers in the frequency
domain. However, in 5G, a RB is only defined in the frequency domain. As given in Table 4.6, the
bandwidth per RB can vary depending on the numerology.

CHAPTER 4. COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT RAN SCHEDULING METHODS
Bandwidth [MHz]

15 kHZ

30 kHZ

60 kHZ

5
10
15
20
25
30
40
50
60
80
90
100

25
52
79
106
133
160
216
270
NA
NA
NA
NA

11
24
38
51
65
78
106
133
162
217
245
273

NA
11
18
24
31
38
51
65
79
107
121
135
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Table 4.6: Maximum number of RBs for each channel bandwidth .

However, there is a maximum number of RBs for each channel bandwidth and subcarrier spacing
as specified by 3GPP [29] and can be summarized in Table 4.7.

4.3

Prioritized Scheduling with Round Robin

Round robin scheduling is an algorithm that schedules the processes fairly by distributing all
of the available resources among the processes, giving each process an equal, fixed amount of time,
known as a time quantum. It is considered to be an efficient algorithm to avoid starvation since all
of the processes in the ready queue will be executed in the same amount of time [31]. A flow chart
for the round robin scheduling algorithm is as shown in Fig. 4.4.
On the other hand, priority scheduling is an algorithm that schedules the processes depending
on their priority. A process with a higher priority would be admitted to the network first. A flow
chart of the Prioritized Round Robin (PRR) scheduling algorithm is shown in Fig. 4.5.
Scheduling algorithms may be compared on the basis of different times, including the turn
around time and the waiting time. The turn around time is the total amount of time spent by
the process from coming in the ready state for the first time to its completion. It can be expressed
by the following equation:
Turn Around Time = Burst time + Waiting time
The waiting time is the total time spent by the process in the ready state waiting to be
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Figure 4.4: Round Robin Flow Chart
admitted. It can be expressed by the following equation:
Waiting Time = Turn around time − Burst time
Prioritized scheduling with round robin is a modified scheduling algorithm that combines the
two types of scheduling which are: round robin, and priority scheduling. URLLC traffic is assigned
with the highest priority, while we use round robin to avoid starvation for eMBB traffic that has
low priority.

4.3.1

Considerations in Prioritized Round Robin Simulation

To provide a concrete illustration of how prioritized round robin works and give numerical
results, we have engaged in a simulation study. In the simulation study, we consider the following
parameters:
1. Subcarrier Spacing: The subcarrier spacing considered in the simulation is 30 kHz.
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Figure 4.5: Prioritized Round Robin Flow Chart
2. Time quantum: For the simulation, the time quantum used in the system is the slot duration
for each use case in the prioritized static round robin. While in the prioritized dynamic round
robin, the time quantum is the burst time for the use case.

slot Duration =

1
SCS
15kHZ

=

1
30kHZ
15kHZ

= 0.5 ms

3. Bandwidth: 20 MHz
4. Resource Blocks: For the subcarrier spacing of 30 kHz and using 20 MHz for the bandwidth,
referring to Table 4.6, the number of resource blocks is 51. However, the resource block
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Simulation Parameter

Value

eMBB Users
URLLC Users
Subcarrier Spacing
Frequency
Number of Frames
Resource Blocks
Slot Duration

4
2
30 kHZ
20 MHz
20
51
0.5 ms
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Table 4.7: Simulation Parameters.

requests are generated randomly for each user, eMBB would require more resource blocks
than the URLLC use cases.
5. Burst Time: The burst time in round-robin scheduling is the time that each process needs
to finish its execution. The burst time for each process can be calculated based on the needs
of the resource blocks.

Burst Time =

slot Duration × RB request
RB available

6. Arrival Times: between every two eMBB processes, one URLLC process is generated.
7. Number of Frames: Number of frames in the simulation are 20. Each radio frame is 10
ms.
8. Number of Slots in the Frame:
f rame
Nslots
=

10
10
=
= 20 slots
slot Duration
0.5

9. Number of Slots in the Simulation:
Sim
Nslots
= Number of Frames × Number of Slots in Frames = 20 × 20 = 400 slots.

10. Priority: URLLC use cases are assigned to have a higher priority than eMBB use cases.
However, there are many different ways to improve the performance of the round robin scheduling algorithm.
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Prioritized Round Robin Algorithm with Static Time Quantum

A round robin scheduling algorithm with a static time quantum uses a fixed value for the time
quantum for each process execution. In this case, we consider the coexistence scenario of the two
different use cases, URLLC, and eMBB. We prioritize the URLLC use cases by assigning them a
higher priority than the eMBB traffic. The time quantum value that is used is the actual value of
the slot Duration which is 0.5 ms.

4.3.3

Prioritized Round Robin Algorithm with Dynamic Time Quantum

To optimize the round robin algorithm scheduling, we use a dynamic time quantum. The value
that is used for the time quantum will not be a fixed value, it will change depending on each use
case. The time quantum will be the same as the burst time of each use case, which is the total
time that a use case needs to complete its execution.

4.4

Comparing Results

After conducting 3 trials of the simulation, the results are shown in Figs. 4.9 - 4.11 and Tables
4.8, 4.9. We compare the results based on the waiting and turn around times.

4.4.1

Waiting Times Static vs Dynamic

For the waiting time, It is shown that the PRR using a dynamic time quantum shows better
results than using a static time quantum, and that is because varying the time quantum based
on the UE needs would help avoid having idle resources and that would decrease the transmission
time of the next available use case that is in the ready queue waiting to be admitted as shown in
Fig. 4.9, 4.7 and 4.8. Moreover, looking at the average waiting time and average turnaround time
that is shown in Table 4.8, the average waiting time for the overall simulation is improved, so that
it does not cause the eMBB traffic which has a low priority, to get jammed and affect their latency
requirements.
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Trial

PRR Static Time Quantum

PRR Dynamic Time Quantum

1
2
3

0.47385
1.1535
1.0571

0.4084
1.0441
0.8921
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Table 4.8: Comparison of Average Waiting Times in ms

Figure 4.6: Waiting Times for Prioritized Round Robin Static vs Dynamic Time Quantum (trial
1)

4.4.2

Turn Around Times Static vs Dynamic

Turn around time is the amount of time for each use case from the arrival to the ready queue till
their completion of execution. The goal is to minimize the turnaround time for URLLC use cases,
as seen in the figures 4.9 - 4.8, using PRR with a dynamic time quantum is showing better results
that are due to giving each use case their resource needs, without having to assign each process an
equal amount of time in a circular order. Resource block needs for each UE can be calculated from
the burst time and resource block request for each use case. The eMBB use cases usually have a
higher turnaround time because they usually request more resources than the URLLC use cases.
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Figure 4.7: Waiting Times for Prioritized Round Robin Static vs Dynamic Time Quantum (trial
2)

Figure 4.8: Waiting Times for Prioritized Round Robin Static vs Dynamic Time Quantum (trial
3)
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Trial

PRR Static Time Quantum

PRR Dynamic Time Quantum

1
2
3

1.6503
2.4771
2.2663

1.5849
2.3676
2.1013
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Table 4.9: Comparison of Average Turn Around Times in ms

Figure 4.9: Turn Around Times for Prioritized Round Robin Static vs Dynamic Time Quantum
(trial 1)

4.5

Secured RAN Slicing

Network slicing is considered to be a new technology and we have identified some of the security
threats in network slicing or RAN specifically, as discussed in chapter 3. There are many significant
challenges within the implementation of RAN. One of the main security threats is the Denial of
Service (DoS) and the exhaustion of resources. To avoid such a vulnerability, isolation technology
must be used to ensure the isolation of resources, traffic, and users. However, with the small
cells enabled technology in 5G, millimeter waves should be Incorporated to avoid interference or
RAN technologies [26]. Ensuring security in RAN slicing is essential, due to having to meet the
Quality of Service (QoS) and the Quality of Experience (QoE). Every slice would have a tenant
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Figure 4.10: Turn Around Times for Prioritized Round Robin Static vs Dynamic Time Quantum
(trial 2)

Figure 4.11: Turn Around Times for Prioritized Round Robin Static vs Dynamic Time Quantum
(trial 3)
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that is responsible for the management of the radio resources in the slice, some of the management
functions should be isolated from the other slices such as authentication and authorization. In
addition, operators and tenants are responsible to manage the resource to assure that each slice is
equipped with the maximum amount of resources that it needs and all resources must be isolated.
RAN must be configured properly for each slice based on the slice’s demands. Some parameters
must be isolated to achieve high security and meet the demands of each use case. First, isolating
the network traffic so that each slice has its network traffic flow and wouldn’t exhaust the shared
network resources. Second, setting a bandwidth for each slice based on their needs and priority.
Isolating the bandwidth would avoid utilizing the assigned bandwidth for the other slices [32].
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Chapter 5

Conclusion
5.1

Summary

Network slicing is a feature of 5G that distinguishes it from the previous network generations.
It is considered to be the backbone behind 5G technology [27]. Network slicing is one of the
technologies that will lead to the success of the fifth-generation mobile network. This is because it
allows the network to achieve different capabilities. For instance, it enables different kinds of 5G
connectivity in terms of high data speeds and low latency.
In Chapter 2, we define the concept of network slicing, which is the creation of multiple virtual
networks on top of a shared core infrastructure network. Moreover, network slices are end-to-end
logical networks that are designed to satisfy use case requirements such as high throughput, low
latency, and high reliability.
The architecture of network slicing consists of three layers. The resource layer contains the
network functions and resources to deliver a specific service for an end-user. The network slice
instance layer contains slices that are configured and designed by the request of the end-user.
While the service instance layer has the services that are ready and available for UEs. Each slice
undergoes four stages: commissioning, activation, run-time, and decommissioning. Network slicing
can happen in either the core network or in the Radio Access Network (RAN).
The network slicing concept deploys the network function virtualization and orchestration that
assigns a tenant that is responsible for managing the resources for each slice. However, that has
allowed for new security vulnerabilities such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) and resource
exhaustion. There are some representative security threats in the network slicing architecture, and
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some can happen within the life-cycle of a network slice. In addition, some security concerns can be
analyzed concerning the network slice giving rise to the inter-slice and intra-slice security concerns.
Understanding these risks in depth helps to explore mitigation strategies that can be employed
to avoid such risks. In Chapter 3 we have represented some of the challenges in the 5G network,
network slicing, and slicing in the Radio Access Network (RAN). While we have also represented
some of the technological solutions to minimize the security concerns raised by network slicing. One
of the solutions is the isolation of network slices by limiting the communication between slices, subslices, and resources host. We have included some other solutions, such as securing the management
and orchestration and designing an end-to-end security system.
Lastly, in Chapter 4 we have designed an algorithm that combines the two scheduling algorithms,
round-robin scheduling with priority scheduling. The main goal of the algorithm is to give the Ultrareliable-low-latency (URLLC) a high priority since it is sensitive in terms of latency and reliability
and gives the enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB) a lower priority. We used a round-robin to
avoid the starvation that is caused by admitting the use cases with higher priority to the network,
while the other use cases with low priority such as eMBB get jammed in the ready queue waiting
to be admitted to the network. There were two proposed scheduling algorithms, the prioritized
round-robin (PRR) which uses a static time quantum, and the prioritized round-robin which uses
a dynamic time quantum.

5.2

Future work

The simulation presented in this thesis is based on the scenario of eMBB-URLLC coexistence.
We considered implementing the scheduling algorithm for use cases admission, we compared waiting
times and turnaround times for each use case for both of the cases, PRR that uses a dynamic vs
static time quantum. A great extension to the implementation would be simulating the given
scenario in a network simulator to measure the latency for the URLLC use cases, the throughput
for the eMBB use cases, and creating a traffic generator by instantiating packets objects to keep on
track with the reliability, throughput, and latency constraints. In addition to looking at the priority
levels of the security control tasks in scheduling simulations to compare the overall performance.
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[13] S. Hakola, T. Chen, J. Lehtomäki, and T. Koskela, “Device-to-device (d2d) communication
in cellular network-performance analysis of optimum and practical communication mode
selection,” in 2010 IEEE wireless communication and networking conference. IEEE, 2010,
pp. 1–6.
[14] P. Subedi, A. Alsadoon, P. Prasad, S. Rehman, N. Giweli, M. Imran, and S. Arif, “Network
slicing: A next generation 5g perspective,” EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications
and Networking, vol. 2021, no. 1, pp. 1–26, 2021.
[15] K. Sienkiewicz, W. Latoszek, and P. Krawiec, “Services orchestration within 5g
networks—challenges and solutions,” in 2018 Baltic URSI Symposium (URSI). IEEE, 2018,
pp. 265–268.
[16] M. Richart, J. Baliosian, J. Serrat, and J.-L. Gorricho, “Resource allocation and management
techniques for network slicing in wifi networks,” in NOMS 2020-2020 IEEE/IFIP Network
Operations and Management Symposium. IEEE, 2020, pp. 1–6.
[17] 5GAmericas, “Network Slicing for 5G Networks
Services,” Network Slicing for
5G and Beyond, 11 2016. [Online]. Available:
https://www.5gamericas.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/07/5GA mericasN etworkS licing1 1.21F inal.pdf
[18] F. Granelli, “Network slicing,” in Computing in Communication Networks.
pp. 63–76.

Elsevier, 2020,

[19] R. F. Olimid and G. Nencioni, “5g network slicing: A security overview,” IEEE Access,
vol. 8, pp. 99 999–100 009, 2020.
[20] M. A. Habibi, B. Han, and H. D. Schotten, “Network slicing in 5g mobile communication
architecture, profit modeling, and challenges,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.00852, 2017.
[21] J. Mei, X. Wang, and K. Zheng, “An intelligent self-sustained ran slicing framework
for diverse service provisioning in 5g-beyond and 6g networks,” Intelligent and Converged
Networks, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 281–294, 2020.
[22] P. Wright, C. White, R. C. Parker, J.-S. Pegon, M. Menchetti, J. Pearse, A. Bahrami,
A. Moroz, A. Wonfor, R. V. Penty et al., “5g network slicing with qkd and quantum-safe
security,” Journal of Optical Communications and Networking, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 33–40, 2021.
[23] S. E. Elayoubi, S. B. Jemaa, Z. Altman, and A. Galindo-Serrano, “5g ran slicing for verticals:
Enablers and challenges,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 28–34, 2019.
[24] D. Sattar and A. Matrawy, “Towards secure slicing: Using slice isolation to mitigate ddos
attacks on 5g core network slices,” in 2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network
Security (CNS). IEEE, 2019, pp. 82–90.
[25] X. Li, M. Samaka, H. A. Chan, D. Bhamare, L. Gupta, C. Guo, and R. Jain, “Network
slicing for 5g: Challenges and opportunities,” IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 21, no. 5, pp.
20–27, 2017.
[26] A. Mathew, “Network slicing in 5g and the security concerns,” in 2020 Fourth International
Conference on Computing Methodologies and Communication (ICCMC). IEEE, 2020, pp.
75–78.

REFERENCES

50
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